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ELECTION ANALYSIS 
 
 
Financial Regulation: 
Can We Avoid Another Great Recession? 
 
• The Great Recession of 2008-2010 had its roots in the crisis of financial markets, 
which spread to the real economy.  
 
• The structural problem with the financial sector is that there is strong ‘contagion’ 
between institutions within the financial sector and also between the financial sector 
and other parts of the economy. A large bank can pull down the financial sector, 
which can, in turn, pull down large parts of the rest of the economy in a ‘domino 
effect’. 
 
• Because of these contagion effects, governments will inevitably bail out banks; and 
because banks know this, they take excessive risks. This structural ‘moral hazard’ 
problem has not been dealt with by the existing regulatory regime. 
 
• To deal with the problem, we need to (a) make bankruptcy more credible; (b) shrink 
the size of banks so that there are fewer organisations that are ‘too big to fail’; and (c) 
improve existing regulations in a variety of ways. 
 
• Most current proposals do not deal with this fundamental problem. Improving 
corporate governance, reforming bankers’ pay and crude taxes on all banks and/or 
financial transactions are mainly distractions. 
 
• Without reform, the risks of a repeat financial crisis have increased. There is less 
uncertainty that governments will bail out banks, and key sectors like investment 
banking are more concentrated.  
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Introduction 
 
The fall in the UK’s GDP since the start of the recession in 2008 has been greater than any 
other since the Great Depression. The global Great Recession originated in the financial 
services sector, especially after the collapse of Lehman in September 2008. 
 
Although there were many catalysts – such as the global macroeconomic imbalance between 
high spending America and high saving Asia, and inflated property markets – these problems 
became toxic because of the financial sector. There was an extraordinary mispricing of risk, 
which led, in crisis, to massive state support and the subsequent deterioration of the public 
finances. 
 
This Election Analysis examines what went wrong with the regulatory system for finance and 
how can it be fixed. 
 
 
The fundamental problem 
 
There are two key economic considerations: 
  
First, liquidity problems in some financial institutions can spread very quickly through other 
institutions. This is what is called the within-industry ‘contagion’ effect: when the system is 
interconnected, ‘systemic risk’ is high, and the whole system can collapse. What makes this 
is a particular problem is that all businesses rely on finance to function – when the sector 
contracts, it pulls down the real economy with it. Crises in other industries are painful – car 
manufacturing, for example – but not fatal to the health of the economic system. 
 
Second, there are excessive incentives for risk-taking in financial institutions. This is the 
result of the government offering (explicit or implicit) protection for financial institutions 
against bankruptcy. This in turn protects lenders – and not just depositors, but largely all 
lenders – from bad decisions. This is the ‘moral hazard’ problem. 
 
The moral hazard issue is largely a result of an effort to avoid the contagion effects: avoiding 
panics requires insuring depositors and other players, and this requires regulating the industry 
to avoid excessive risk. In other words, if we are going to provide rescues and bailouts, we 
have to limit risk-taking. Unfortunately, these regulatory safeguards did not work. 
 
The essence of capitalism is that people accept responsibility for the risks they take – they 
enjoy the upside wins, but also suffer the pain if the bet goes the wrong way. Without this, we 
get the moral hazard problem as the downside protection encourages firms to take excessive 
risk. In other words, ‘heads, I win; tails, society loses’.  
 
 
Narrow banking and the Volcker Rule  
 
A large part of the initial reform push has focused on the ‘Volcker rule’. This is the 
suggestion made by President Obama is that ‘Banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, 
or sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, proprietary trading operations or for their own 
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profit, unrelated to serving their customers.’1
 
 This has been enthusiastically embraced by the 
UK opposition parties.  
Although the proposal tackles one aspect of the problem – a bank gets cheap money thanks to 
deposit insurance, and then uses it to gamble on the casino of ‘proprietary trading’ – it has 
two shortcomings. 
 
The first shortcoming is that ‘prop trading’ is not the only way financial institutions take 
excessive risks; in the recent past, the largest problems have been in their ‘plain vanilla’ loan 
portfolios – banks can take too much risk in simple mortgage-backed real estate loans. In 
fact, several of the key institutions that collapsed – AIG, Lehman, Northern Rock and Bear 
Stearns – would have been left completely unaffected by the Volcker rule. 
 
A second shortcoming of the proposal is that its implementation would be extremely 
complicated. Separating hedging activities from pure speculation has always been 
extraordinarily difficult. 
 
 
Making bankruptcy credible 
 
The solution must lie in reinstituting some fundamental discipline: if a company has too 
much debt and becomes insolvent, taxpayers have no responsibility. The company suspends 
payments, it closes and its shareholders and creditors lose their money. 
 
How can this threat be reinstituted and become credible for financial institutions after 
Lehman? To make bankruptcy attain the role of disciplining managerial behaviour, two 
changes need to take place: 
 
(1) Financial institutions must be of a size, complexity and interconnectivity that allows the 
regulator to promise credibly that they will be allowed to fail. In other words, there must 
be no banks ‘too big to fail’. As US Congressman Sanders and Bank of England 
Governor Mervyn King put it: ‘if you are too big to fail, you are too big to exist’. This 
can be done through a tax that grows with the size of assets or a literal limit to the size of 
the balance sheet. 
 
(2) Living wills2
 
 must be credible and real, so that any financial institution can disappear in 
a weekend without creating chaos – unlike in the post-Lehman disaster. 
Of course, size is not the only characteristic that defines a systemic institution, but it must be 
one of the relevant criteria. First, size should be size in the country. For example, while 
Deutsche Bank (DB) has a balance sheet in the billions of dollars, similar to the Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS), home assets of DB are only 16% of German GDP while for RBS, they are 
71% of UK GDP.3
 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform.  
2 A living will is a clear statement over what would happen to the assets of a bank were it to fail. Thus it forces 
transparency on the counterparty risks of different positions held by the bank. These need not necessarily be 
made public, but they must be available in a timely fashion to the regulator. 
3 JP Morgan Europe Equity Research, ‘Global Banks: Too Big to Fail?’, 27 February 2010, p9. 
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Second, the diversity and complexity of activities within a bank and the interrelationships 
between them should also be critical criteria in establishing the systemic risk of an 
institution. If investors and counterparties cannot have a view of what the institution is doing, 
any problem in any activity may raise doubts about the viability of the whole institution. But 
complexity also makes it hard for the supervisor to predict the consequences of failure, and 
thus makes it more likely that intervention will be needed. 
 
Third, the centrality of the institution matters. An institution that is very closely connected to 
others in the system will be more likely to bring others down in case of bankruptcy. 
 
Finally, there are institutions that by their peculiar sphere of action and the novelty of their 
activities, either by the use of financial innovations or simply expanding their business 
activities, may pose more systemic risk.  
 
Once identified, systemic institutions require unique regulatory solutions. Ideally, no 
institution should be systemic. Credible bankruptcy requires that no institution is too big, too 
complex or too central; regulators should ensure that this is the case. 
 
 
Taxing bank size 
 
An alternative approach to dealing with size is by taxing it – by imposing a cost on the 
institutions that grow too large so that institutions may be forced to internalise the externality 
they impose on the system due to the lack of bankruptcy threat. This would allow extremely 
efficient banks to grow large as they would be willing to bear the costs of a highly 
progressive tax. 
 
A particularly appealing form (and related to the Obama tax proposals) would be to tax 
institutions as a function of the amount of short-term financing they are using. This is a 
variant of the Obama tax on bank non-deposit liabilities, which was proposed in the United 
States only provisionally (to recoup TARP) but which could have a wider economic aim: it 
would simultaneously discourage excessive size and wholesale financing, two of the key 
causes of the crisis.  
 
 
New regulations, better regulators 
 
Making bankruptcy more credible is the essential step that would lead to a more efficient and 
less risky and fragile financial system. But better regulation and regulators are also necessary. 
These should involve three main steps: 
 
1. Centralised derivatives markets: A complement to making bankruptcy more credible 
would be greater transparency. A centralised payment system allows managers access to 
information on the risk exposure of individual institutions. 
 
It is hard to understand why the standard contracts currently traded on over-the-counter 
(OTC) markets are not being traded in centralised markets. Centralised markets would have 
reduced many of the uncertainties that took place after the Lehman collapse and would allow 
investors and supervisors to understand better the evolution of derivative markets. 
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2. Higher liquidity and solvency requirements: A key axis of the current reform proposals is 
increasing solvency requirements. Concerning capital requirements, the main proposal here is 
increasing solvency requirements through contingent capital – debt that would be 
transformed into equity automatically when certain triggers are reached, which could be 
market triggers (such as credit default swap prices4
 
 reaching a certain level) or regulatory 
triggers (core or tier 1 capital reaching a certain minimum). 
These proposals have merit, but as the crises tend to be liquidity driven, and they do not 
really generate ‘true’ new capital, they are unlikely to solve a crisis.  
 
As for liquidity, a key problem was excessive short-term financing of long-term liabilities. 
The tax mentioned above on wholesale or short-term financing would also help to deal with 
this problem. 
 
3. Systemic supervisors: A big push here involves the creation of a new set of worldwide 
systemic supervisors with the function of looking at the ‘forest’ of systemic risk, rather than 
the ‘trees’ of how each individual bank is performing.5
 
 It is essential that supervisors have 
real teeth, including ability to impose penalties on non-complying financial institutions. 
One question is the extent to which the systemic supervisor role must coincide with the 
central banking function and be undertaken by a central bank. Synergies between both 
functions are important as Northern Rock showed.6
 
 
Exercising the ‘lender of last resort’ functions (which only central banks can do) requires 
knowing the state of the banks that may have to be rescued, while the information about the 
state of lending and asset quantities and prices held by the banks is an invaluable tool of 
monetary policy.7
 
 Whether this requires merging the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
back into the Bank of England (as the Conservatives propose) or improving co-operation is 
less clear. 
 
Some non-solutions to the regulation problem: corporate governance and bankers’ 
bonuses 
 
Many of the proposed ‘solutions’ to the problem of financial regulation by the main parties 
are wide of the mark and risk distracting us from the major reform tasks. 
 
Often, policy-makers talk of improved corporate governance to stop senior managers and 
CEOs from ‘ripping off’ shareholders. But for firms relying on the protection of taxpayers, 
the conflict of interest is not fundamentally between bank managers and shareholders because 
the manager wants to earn too much or wants to build an empire or to own a private jet. 
 
Instead, the conflict is between, on one side, managers and shareholders and, on the other 
side, taxpayers. Both managers and shareholders (and even holders of corporate debt) take 
advantage of the protection of the state to take excessive risks, since it is the taxpayer who 
                                                 
4 A method based on credit default swap prices has been proposed by Hart and Zingales (2009). 
5 See Goodhart (2009). 
6 See Shin (2009). 
7 For a clear statement, see the very well argued testimony of Anil Kashyap (2010) to the US Congress; see also 
The Squam Lake Report (2010) and Garicano and Lastra (2010). 
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ends up paying. Therefore proposals to improve transparency and corporate governance are 
completely useless for solving these problems. 
 
Exactly the same argument goes for proposals to align pay more effectively with shareholder 
interests. The structure of annual bonuses for traders and managers in the financial sector 
does encourage an emphasis on short-term excessive risk-taking. But this is likely to be a 
consequence of structural moral hazard not the cause. It is dealing with the symptom and not 
the disease (see Bell and Van Reenen, 2010). 
 
Third, generalised taxes on banks (as proposed by the Conservatives) or global financial 
transactions (proposed by Labour) are not well-targeted at the problem of systemic risk. 
Focusing on a more targeted tax regime to reduce the ‘too big to fail’ problem would be a 
better way to go.  
 
Finally, further competition authority investigations into banking as proposed by the 
opposition parties will tell us what we already know. These have become very concentrated 
industries that threaten welfare – not for the usual reasons (high prices and low innovation) 
but rather for the risks of a further financial meltdown. The cause comes from the problem of 
structural moral hazard and the solutions cannot be delegated to the competition authorities. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The financial meltdown led to the worst post-war recession experienced by the UK and other 
advanced economies. The fundamental regulatory problem in the financial system is that the 
government will bail out the banks because of the risk of contagion from organisations that 
are ‘too big to fail’ to the rest of the economy. This structural moral hazard problem causes 
large financial firms to take excessive risks. 
 
To deal with this we have to operate on the fundamental problem, which means increasing 
the real threat of bankruptcy and shrinking down the organisations that pose such systemic 
risks. We should not get distracted by reforms such as changes in corporate governance, 
bankers’ pay, bank levies, Tobin taxes or competition inquiries. 
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